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By Dennis Chambers and 
Catherine Finger 
“Is there any point to which you would
wish to draw my attention?” 
“To the curious incident of the dog in
the night-time.” 
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.” 
“That was the curious incident,”
remarked Sherlock Holmes.
The legendary fictional detectiveSherlock Holmes, in this excerptfrom “Silver Blaze” by Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle, illustrates that the absence
of something, when it is expected, can pro-
vide strong evidence of actions not direct-
ly observed. This article extends Holmes’s
thinking to the case of goodwill account-
ing. Recent academic research provides
evidence about curious incidents of “good-
will non-impairment”—that is, the absence
of goodwill impairment losses when, like
a dog barking, they are expected. 
When Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) 142 was proposed as a
possible replacement for goodwill amorti-
zation, some academics and practitioners
were concerned that the unverifiable fair
value estimates used to measure goodwill
impairment losses would provide an oppor-
tunity for companies to manage earnings
by delaying the recognition of impairment
losses. After SFAS 142 was enacted in 2001,
accounting researchers had to wait until
enough years of earnings data existed to look
for evidence of goodwill-related earnings
management. Only now, with the recent
release of three working papers, are we get-
ting a first glimpse into the existence of
goodwill non-impairment and how compa-
nies use the discretion in the goodwill stan-
dard to manage earnings. This article dis-
cusses these three studies within the con-
text of Exhibit 1, which presents reporting
possibilities for companies that have good-
will assets. The columns describe whether
the goodwill has become impaired; the rows
describe the accounting choice made by the
firm in response.
If the economic value of a goodwill asset
has decreased, then the goodwill has
become impaired (Exhibit 1, first column).
Goodwill impairment standards require
companies to report the current-year
decline in value as a loss in current-year
net income. Companies that follow the
standards would be in box A. Companies
with impaired goodwill that choose to
either not report the loss or report an under-
stated loss would be in box B (i.e., good-
will non-impairment). Firms in box B may
have used accounting discretion to avoid
reporting a loss; nevertheless, they are not
following the intent of the impairment
reporting standard. 
The three studies report evidence that
goodwill non-impairment does exist (i.e.,
that there are firms in box B). In addition,
the non-impairment is associated with
incentives managers have to overstate earn-
ings. They find evidence that recorded
goodwill impairment losses are absent
when they would cause company earn-
ings to be negative or would cause earn-
ings decreases. Impairment losses are also
absent when they would decrease CEO
compensation, damage CEO reputations,
and cause bond covenant violations.
Finally, evidence suggests that an impair-
ment loss is not recorded at the time a
goodwill asset generates cash flows, as
implied by economic theory, but rather
much later. Therefore, these studies indi-
cate that early concerns of academics and
practitioners were warranted; companies
appear to be using the discretion in good-
will impairment reporting standards to
manage earnings.
Goodwill Accounting Standards
In June 2001, FASB enacted two stan-
dards related to the accounting for good-
will. The first, SFAS 141 (now found in
ASC section 805-30), required that busi-
ness acquisitions would henceforth be
accounted for using the purchase method.
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Under the purchase method, the purchas-
er compares the fair value of all acquired
net assets (total identifiable assets minus
liabilities) with the sum of the fair value
of consideration paid for the acquisition.
The difference is accounted for as a
goodwill asset at the time of the purchase.
(Recently, FASB has modified these pro-
cedures, now calling them the acquisition
method; however, the modifications were
enacted after the sample periods of the
three studies described here.)
The second goodwill-related accounting
standard was SFAS 142 (now found in ASC
section 350-20). This standard abolished sys-
tematic amortization of goodwill and insti-
tuted a procedure for annual goodwill impair-
ment testing. Impairment testing is carried
out at the reporting unit level; a reporting
unit is defined as a portion of the company
one level lower than the segment level (man-
agement decides how much goodwill to allo-
cate to each reporting unit).
SFAS 142 specified the following pro-
cedure for annual goodwill impairment
testing. The company estimates the fair
value of a reporting unit and compares it
with the unit’s book value—including the
book value of goodwill. If the unit’s fair
value is less than its book value, then an
impairment has taken place. A second step
is required to determine whether the good-
will asset is the source of the impairment.
The company estimates the implied fair
value of the unit’s goodwill by subtract-
ing the fair value of the non-goodwill net
assets from the unit’s total fair value—the
residual equals the implied fair value of
goodwill. If the implied fair value of good-
will is less than the goodwill’s book value,
then the goodwill is impaired and the
impairment is equal to that difference. The
impairment losses across all units are
aggregated and recognized, resulting in a
reduction of reported net income.
Discretion in Goodwill Accounting 
The process of testing goodwill assets
for impairment involves many opportuni-
ties for exercising accounting discretion and
potentially permits income manipulation.
First, the initial goodwill asset recorded
under the purchase method and the allo-
cation of the goodwill to reporting units
require the application of accounting dis-
cretion. Next, because reporting units are
not traded separately in the stock market,
verifiable unit fair value measures are not
available. Thus, each unit’s value must be
based on difficult-to-verify estimates of
its future cash flows—cash flows that are
themselves a product of management’s
future decisions and actions as well as
unpredictable future macroeconomic forces.
In addition, estimates of the fair value of
the individual non-goodwill assets and
liabilities are necessarily based on unob-
servable Level 3–type inputs. (According
to ASC section 820-10-35, Level 3 inputs
consist of unobservable characteristics and
assumptions, as compared to Level 1 and
2 inputs, which include actual prices or
other verifiable characteristics.)
Therefore, the process of testing goodwill
for impairment gives significant discretion
to management. If a company’s goodwill has
become impaired, but executives want to
avoid recording an impairment loss, they can
manipulate their estimates to suggest the
goodwill is not impaired and argue that judg-
ment justifies their unimpaired goodwill mea-
sure. In addition, the estimates are difficult
for an auditor to question because they are
based on unverifiable characteristics, assump-
tions, and cash flow projections that are pre-
sumably within the special expertise of man-
agement. Consequently, the potential for
manipulation of impairment loss, and there-
fore reported net income, is very great.
Concerns Expressed Before SFAS 142
When FASB issued the exposure draft for
its proposed goodwill accounting standards,
it found significant opposition. Eric E. Lewis,
Jeffrey W. Lippitt, and Nicholas J.
Mastracchio Jr. noted that comment letters
sent to FASB were highly critical of the dis-
cretion afforded preparers’ estimates of fair
values (“Users’ Comments on SFAS 141
and 142 on Business Combinations and
Goodwill,” The CPA Journal, vol. 71, no.
10, 2001, p. 26). Responders criticized the
use of fair value estimates to determine good-
will value, expressing concern that the pro-
posed estimates were not sufficiently reliable
to justify the recording of asset value
changes. Mark F. Massoud and Cecily A.
Raiborn predicted that the “significant lee-
way” given to companies to value goodwill
would lead to earnings management
(“Accounting for Goodwill: Are We Better
Off?” Review of Business, vol. 24, no. 2,
2003, p. 26). Ross L. Watts also argued
that the discretion given in the new good-
will standard opens the possibility of earn-
ings manipulation: “Assessing impairment
requires valuation of future cash flows.
Because those future cash flows are unlike-
ly to be verifiable and contractible, they, and
the valuation based on them, are likely to
be manipulated” (“Conservatism in
Accounting Part I: Explanations and
Implication,” Accounting Horizons, vol. 17,
no. 3, 2003, pp. 207–221).   
These articles articulate the deep con-
cern many had that the discretion afford-
ed to companies by SFAS 142 would result
in earnings manipulation. We now 
discuss evidence that these concerns were
justified based on one specific type of 
earnings manipulation: goodwill non-
impairment (i.e., not recording a correct
impairment loss when goodwill has
become impaired—Exhibit 1, box B).
Results from Recent Research
Goodwill non-impairments related to
earnings benchmarks. A large body of
accounting research has found evidence
that companies tend to manage their earn-
ings upward to avoid reporting a loss or a
reduction in earnings (e.g., see David
Burgstahler and Ilia Dichev, “Earnings
Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases
and Losses,” Journal of Accounting &
Economics, vol. 24, no. 1, 1997). The
author (Dennis Chambers, “Earnings
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Goodwill is impaired Goodwill is not impaired
Goodwill loss is Box A: No earnings 
correctly recorded management
Goodwill loss is Box B: Upward 
reduced or not recorded earnings management
Box C: No earnings
management
EXHIBIT 1
Reporting Possibilities for Companies That Have Goodwill Assets
Management by Avoiding or Reducing
Goodwill Impairments,” working paper,
2010) asks whether firms use goodwill
impairment accounting to manage their
earnings in this setting. He refers to the
earnings management targets where earn-
ings go from positive to negative (i.e., zero
earnings), and where earnings changes go
from positive to negative, as earnings
“breakpoints.” Chambers looks for evi-
dence that firms avoid or reduce goodwill
impairments in order to report earnings that
are above these breakpoints.
To explain a potentially measurable
result of such earnings management, con-
sider a hypothetical set of 500 firms that
would report earnings below a breakpoint
in the absence of earnings management. Of
those 500, suppose 100 have impaired
goodwill and, as such, their earnings should
include a goodwill impairment loss. In
the absence of earnings management, 20%
of the firms below the breakpoint (100/500)
should report an impairment loss. Now,
suppose that of the 100 with impaired
goodwill, 40 choose to report either no
impairment loss or a reduced loss, allow-
ing those firms to report earnings above
the breakpoint. In this case, only 13% of
the remaining firms below the breakpoint
(60/460) would be reporting an impairment
loss. Chambers’ study examines the firms
just below the breakpoints to see if there
are fewer than expected goodwill impair-
ments among those firms, as evidence of
goodwill-based earnings management.
(Chambers notes that he could also look
for evidence of earnings management
among the firms just above the breakpoint,
but the effect on the percentage of firms
impairing goodwill would be significantly
less and therefore harder to measure.)
Using several advanced statistical meth-
ods to measure the occurrence and size of
goodwill impairments, Chambers finds that
among the firms just below the zero earn-
ings breakpoint, the number impairing
goodwill is 48.8% lower than expected.
Similarly, he finds that among the firms
reporting earnings just below the zero
change-in-earnings breakpoint, the number
with goodwill impairments is 19.9% lower
than expected.
Chambers also finds that the average
company with a reported goodwill asset
impairs 14.6% of that asset in any given
year. However, companies reporting earn-
ings just below zero impair far less of their
goodwill—an average of 1.5%. In the same
way, companies reporting a small reduc-
tion in earnings—those just below the earn-
ings-change breakpoint—report goodwill
impairments that are 6.7 percentage
points lower than average.
Overall, Chambers’ findings are con-
sistent with companies avoiding reporting
impairment losses that would cause earn-
ings to go negative or would cause a
decrease in earnings relative to the previ-
ous period. This is strong evidence that
companies manage earnings by avoiding
or reducing goodwill impairments when
they have incentives to report positive or
increasing earnings.
Goodwill non-impairments related to
CEO reputation, CEO compensation, and
debt covenants. Karthik Ramanna and
Ross L. Watts (“Evidence on the Use of
Unverifiable Estimates in Required
Goodwill Impairment,” 2010, working
paper), describe how FASB expected that
managers, under SFAS 142, “will, on aver-
age, use estimates of goodwill’s fair value
to convey private information on future
cash flows. In contrast, agency theory
predicts managers will on average use
unverifiable discretion, such as that in
goodwill impairment tests, opportunisti-
cally.” Ramanna and Watts examine
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ing 4,737 US domiciled
companies with material
goodwill assets during
the years 2004 through
2008.
124 firms between the
years 2003 and 2006 with
a high likelihood of good-
will impairment based on




years 2000 through 2007.
Main Results
Companies tend to avoid
or reduce goodwill impair-
ments when the impair-
ment would result in the
company reporting a 
loss or a reduction in 
net income.
Contrary to FASB expec-
tations, managers do not
appear to be conveying
positive private informa-
tion when they choose
not to record goodwill
impairment losses.
Goodwill impairments







tend to be delayed until
there is little if any value
remaining in the goodwill
asset, rather than being
impaired as the value
decreases. 
EXHIBIT 2
Results of Related Recent Working Papers
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whether goodwill non-impairment is
associated with either positive private infor-
mation or opportunistic behavior by select-
ing a sample of firms for which the mar-
ket may expect impairments. Within that
group of firms, they then compare the char-
acteristics of firms that record a goodwill
impairment loss (i.e., box A) with the firms
that do not (i.e., boxes B and C).
Goodwill non-impairment is justified
when managers legitimately believe, based
on positive private information, that the
current book value of goodwill does not
overstate its fair value (i.e., box C).
Ramanna and Watts assess whether man-
agers’ positive private information is
associated with goodwill non-impairment.
They measure positive private information
by looking for company stock repurchas-
es and insider buying activity—each of
these would be indications that manage-
ment believes the company’s stock is
undervalued. They also use advanced con-
tent analysis to measure the extent to which
management includes “achievement-relat-
ed words” in the companies’ 10-Ks. Higher
numbers of such words are interpreted as
greater positive private information. They
find no significant relation between any
of their measures of positive private
information and the recording of goodwill
impairment losses. This result is inconsis-
tent with managers using goodwill account-
ing discretion to convey their positive pri-
vate information, as intended by FASB.
Ramanna and Watts then assess whether
potential earnings management behavior is
related to goodwill non-impairment (i.e., box
B). Specifically, they examine a number of
characteristics likely to create incentives to
delay impairments. These include high stock
price sensitivity to earnings, exchange list-
ing requirements sensitive to goodwill
impairments, long CEO tenure (as a proxy
for CEO reputation), and debt covenants and
CEO compensation contracts that are sensi-
tive to goodwill impairments. They find no
evidence that stock-price sensitivity or
exchange listing requirements are associat-
ed with goodwill non-impairments. Among
the non-impairing firms, however, they
find a statistically higher proportion with
goodwill-inclusive debt covenants, goodwill-
inclusive CEO compensation contracts, and
longer CEO tenure.
Overall, Ramanna and Watts find little
evidence that managers use the discretion
in goodwill accounting as FASB intended:
to convey private information about
goodwill assets. Instead, they find evidence
consistent with managers managing good-
will impairment losses in order to reduce
debt covenant violations, increase CEO
compensation, and protect CEO reputation.
Goodwill non-impairments related to
cash flows. Kevin K. Li and Richard G.
Sloan (“Has Goodwill Accounting Gone
Bad?” 2009, working paper) examine
whether goodwill impairments occur in a
timely way. The fair value of goodwill, 
as with any asset, should be equal to the 
present value of the future cash flows expect-
ed to be gained from the goodwill asset.
Therefore, ironically, goodwill should lose
the most value (and impairment losses
should be greatest) in the periods when the
largest cash flows from goodwill are real-
ized (consistent with the matching principle). 
Li and Sloan use advanced statistical
techniques to examine whether goodwill
impairment losses are recorded at the
time when they are expected (i.e., when
high positive goodwill-related cash flows
are realized). Contrary to expectations,
impairment losses are associated with poor
company performance—low positive or
negative goodwill-related cash flows. In
other words, companies appear to delay the
recording of goodwill impairment losses
until the related cash flows are almost
exhausted, long after the fair value of the
goodwill has been lost.
Implications for Auditors
When FASB issued the exposure draft
that eventually became SFAS 142, there was
great concern that the discretion given to
companies to value goodwill would result in
companies using manipulated goodwill
impairment losses to manage earnings. Now
that sufficient years have passed since the
enactment of SFAS 142, accounting
researchers have begun to look for evi-
dence that those concerns were justified.
Although no studies have yet been published,
the three recent working papers described in
this article provide strong initial evidence that
companies are indeed using their discretion
in determining goodwill fair value to delay
or reduce goodwill impairments in order to
manage earnings.
It behooves auditors and investors alike
to give special attention to the goodwill
assets of companies reporting earnings, or
a change in earnings, just above zero.
These companies have strong incentives to
manipulate goodwill impairment testing to
avoid reporting a loss or a reduction in
earnings. Similarly, auditors should care-
fully examine goodwill fair value measures
when related impairments would lead to
losses that would significantly decrease
CEO compensation, damage CEO reputa-
tions, or violate bond covenants. Finally,
if a company has high cash flows that
appear to stem from goodwill assets,
auditors should make sure the corre-
sponding impairment of goodwill fair value
has also been recorded.  Based on these
recent academic studies of goodwill impair-
ment, it is likely that at least some com-
panies are manipulating their impairment
testing to delay or reduce goodwill impair-
ments consistent with opportunistic earn-
ings management. ❑
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